Nuclear or bust: Canadians face uncomfortable choice for new submarines

The Royal Canadian Navy recently began the process for replacing its four Victoria class diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) with a core consideration being increased Arctic capabilities. Purchased secondhand from the United Kingdom, the Victorias are infamous in the Canadian psyche: poorly preserved while awaiting their new Canadian owners, the submarines required major repairs to the hull and mechanical systems. By the time basic issues were rectified, their combat systems needed updates, requiring more time out of service. Although these long-awaited upgrades have made our submarines’ sonar processors and torpedoes nearly as good as their nuclear-powered American counterparts, they could not fix fundamental gaps in the submarines’ design. Built for the U.K.’s Royal Navy, they lacked the Arctic under-ice capability sought by Canadians. From my discussions with key Department of National Defence decision makers, such a capability underpins any Victoria replacement option. This aligns with the Canadian public’s historical perception that submarines—rightly or wrongly—are key to our Arctic sovereignty. Despite the Arctic’s growing geopolitical significance and increasing maritime traffic, the upgraded Victoria class have spent most of their limited sailing times this past decade in the Far East and West, not North. HMCS Chicoutimi sailed to Japan in 2017-2018, from which it monitored North Korean sanctions, while HMCS Windsor tracked Russian submarines in 2016 when exercising with NATO allies in Europe. A major question becomes: should the Victoria replacements emphasize overseas operations, or should they focus on the “Strong at Home” part of our defence policy? In both cases, the design requirements will converge in terms of size: operating overseas and in the Canadian Arctic both call for fairly large submarines. A larger hull carries more provisions, fuel, and crew for long deployments, while providing sufficient mass and buoyancy to break through ice when surfacing. Previously, nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) were the only ones of such sizes, but today there are some very large SSKs using “air-independent propulsion” (AIP) technologies to extend their time spent underwater. Foremost among these are the Japanese Taigei and South Korea’s Dosan Ahn Chang-ho classes. At 3,000 tons, they are larger than France’s 2,600-ton Rubis class, tentatively selected for Canada’s cancelled SSN program in the 1980s. European firms have advertised similar large designs, but their in-production submarines are mostly smaller than the Victorias. However, even large submarines require relatively thin ice when breaching the surface to recharge batteries, communicate, collect intelligence, or launch missiles. Locating such ice may take days, given the uncertain nature of sea ice and careful navigation required in Canada’s narrow and often shallow Northwest Passage. While AIP systems promise long endurance for SSKs, the degree of that endurance depends on how fast the alternative fuel is being consumed. This may be fine in warmer waters, but Arctic captains may be reluctant to test the limits of their AIP fuel lest they find themselves stuck under the ice with insufficient reserves to reach open water. Arctic underwater operations thus require the nigh-infinite capacity of nuclear power. SSNs remain the only reliable option for extended under-ice operations. A large SSK may be able to send uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) ahead into the ice, but underwater wireless communications are incredibly short-ranged while overhead ice snaps satellite antennas. Seabed “stations” might allow frequent contact with the UUV, but they are vulnerable to natural erosion by deep-drafted icebergs or intentional sabotage just like the UUV itself. Ultimately, Canada is a geopolitical outlier. The three oceans serving as such capable moats against invasion are the same ones requiring the Navy to spend extra dollars to make its influence felt overseas and in the Arctic. It is the only middle power operating diesel-electric submarines far from home—a task that new large AIP submarines can improve upon. For its Arctic home waters, however, the only sensible option is nuclear power with its immense acquisition and infrastructure costs. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau recently squashed the notion of Canada procuring SSNs “anytime soon,” but with the decades-long lead time required for submarine procurement, procrastinating in hopes of a future non-nuclear solution is impractical. Canadians must decide now: either go all-in on nuclear-powered submarines, like the Australians recently announced, or drop the Arctic requirement once and for all. Timothy Choi is completing his PhD comparing Canadian, Norwegian, and Danish naval power at the University of Calgary. He is a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and is a consultant on antisubmarine warfare for the British American Security Information Council. He has briefed the Department of National Defence on Canada’s submarine history and recently co-authored an article in the Journal of Strategic Studies on potential Chinese submarine operations in the Arctic. The Hill Times