Negotiating a new Minsk III accord a path forward as Ukraine war hits crossroads

We are at a strategic crossroads in the Ukraine war. Training Ukrainians to fly advanced Western fighter jets would be time-consuming and difficult. They likely would be perceived by Russia as offensive long-range weapons that could be used to strike deep inside Russian territory. Their deployment could provoke Russians into threatening more retaliatory use of tactical nuclear weapons, especially if Russia is losing on the battlefield. Ukrainians are using Soviet-era fighter jets, manufactured over 30 years ago, while Russia is utilizing heavy-duty jets that can fire missiles from a long range even without flying over Ukrainian airspace. Now the question is whether to train Ukrainians to operate F-35s, F-16s, Eurofighters, Tornadoes, or Saab Griffins. In January, Canada announced it planned to replace its aging CF-18s and purchase a new fleet of 88 advanced fighter jets comprised of F-35’s, at an estimated cost of $19-billion. The first of those aircraft will not be available until 2026. One possible option affording quick Ukrainian adaptation and less time-consuming training requirements would be to release more advanced MiG-29 aircraft from Poland and other former Soviet allies. Withheld largely out of American concern about provoking Moscow, Poland could dispatch them and request their replacement with more-sophisticated F-16s. Ukraine should also receive more extensive anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence systems; poverty-stricken Afghanistan had one that was disabled before the Taliban could take it over. Debates about providing the Ukrainians with fighter jets might show the Russians that Western resolve remains high and unshaken in the face of Moscow’s continued offensives and bombardments. However, nervous trigger-fingers might also result in preemptive Russian moves to prevent a Ukrainian attack on Crimea or Russian nuclear missile bases. The pro-Ukrainian coalition must carefully weigh and prepare for escalations, particularly because Russia might “escalate to de-escalate.” U.S. President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken made it clear at the United Nations General Assembly, and on the sidelines, that any Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons would force the United States to bomb the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, triggering a large-scale war. Both sides have already lost possibly 300,000 to 400,000 soldiers on the battlefield. Therefore, it is also time to proceed to the negotiating tables. It is important to return to bargaining, at least to ensure Ukrainian grain shipments continue to proceed through the Black Sea even in the midst of brutal warfare. European allies should also seize the prospect of rejigging the Minsk II Accord as a practical step toward a wider peace. French President Emmanuel Macron is pointing to the 2015 Minsk agreement as a blueprint for a breakthrough following talks last week with his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts. Under the multilateral auspices of the region-wide Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Minsk I—an earlier failed attempt at a ceasefire agreement—was followed by Minsk II, which posed local autonomy provisions for Donbas provinces in Eastern Ukraine. “Minsk III” might, perhaps, propose autonomy on the order of the Scottish and Northern Irish parliaments in the United Kingdom, as well as confirm that Ukraine should not be invited into NATO as an ally, provided the Russians pull back. Ukrainians may well see the fulfillment of Minsk II provisions as a concession to Russian aggression. However, deep concessions will be needed on both sides soon. The Minsk II agreement suggested more dialogue on interim self-government, supervised elections for Donetsk and Luhansk, acknowledgment of the region’s special status by Ukraine’s parliament, advanced OSCE monitoring, and the withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides. Representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, and the leaders of separatist-held regions Donetsk and Luhansk signed the 13-point agreement in 2015. Now it could be the basis for further negotiations in 2023 and an immediate, comprehensive ceasefire, including promises to refrain from receiving more foreign-supplied military equipment, halt Russian infiltration, and refrain from hiring mercenaries. A new Minsk deal could promise to pardon amnesty fighters on the ground, and call for the immediate dispatch of UN standby peacekeeping forces overseeing troop withdrawals and separate warring forces. A UN-operated high-readiness standby force might oversee a UN-supervised referendum on the future of Crimea. “Minsk III” could be combined with “Marshall Plan 2.0” guaranteeing massive financial assistance from the West and Moscow toward rebuilding war-torn Ukraine. Rather than promise potentially destabilizing fighters in the air that lead to arms spirals, the financial incentives would be for pro-Russian Ukrainians to emigrate to Russia; rebuild war-decimated buildings and towns; and construct sustainable energy sources that reduce both sides’ security dilemmas. Frederic S. Pearson is a professor of political science and former director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at Wayne State University in Detroit. Erika Simpson is an associate professor of international politics at the University of Western Ontario and president of the Canadian Peace Research Association. The Hill Times

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Negotiating a new Minsk III accord a path forward as Ukraine war hits crossroads

The 2015 Minsk II agreement could be the basis for further negotiations and an immediate, comprehensive ceasefire.

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