Time to retool Canada’s Arctic strategy in the face of Russian aggression

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has Canada, its NATO allies, and foreign policy scholars looking to the Arctic region as the potential next site for future Russian aggression—with good reason. Russia’s buildup on the borders of Ukraine took place over a period of months. The buildup of Russia’s Arctic military capacity has been underway for years. Make no mistake; Canada has indeed identified the North and the Arctic as a strategic area of importance through its own policy entitled Strong, Secure, Engaged. However, in comparison to NATO ally spending, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and Norway, we have room to grow our financial commitment and capability. Under the Donald Trump administration, all four U.S. services—the navy, army, air force, and coast guard—prepared Arctic strategies. During this same period, Canada co-developed an Arctic and Northern Policy Framework with territorial, provincial, and Indigenous governments and organizations. Following the advice of now-Governor General Mary Simon, the Government of Canada chose an inclusive and collaborative process that included inhabitants of our Arctic region as well as Canada’s foreign and defence apparatus. Canada’s defence hawks likely do not see “co-development” as a good use of time or effort—or even as strategic. However, in the final analysis, it may yet prove to be the wisest investment our resources and time. Here’s why. Canada’s North and its Arctic belong to its inhabitants as Canadian citizens, their governments, and treaties that demonstrate a shared commitment to the rule of law. Today, those peoples and their governments have expressed their voice and their priorities through Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF). The result is a mechanism to enable the federal government to move quickly and co-operatively to enhance Canada’s Arctic defence capabilities and secure valuable energy and strategic metal reserves, and, at the same time, build a more prosperous and sustainable region. The foreign policy and defence chapters of the ANPF rely heavily on a pre-pandemic and pre-Russian invasion view the world. This view places a premium on a global consensus existing on a rules-based approach to the Arctic that centres on co-operation and non-military activities co-ordinated and supported by the Arctic Council. Russia is the current chair of the Arctic Council, according to the rotational nature that governs the body (the chair changes every two years according to a set order). Recent events have resulted in members other than Russia declaring a pause on all Arctic Council work until further notice. Canada’s Arctic residents and communities have not always had a collaborative working relationship with the federal government on issues such as sovereignty, industrial development, or public administration. Residential schools, forced relocations, and ballistic-missile testing have wrought hardship and difficult legacies that have scarred the land and its people, and driven historical divisions even further. That said, in recent years, the Rangers and contracting with Indigenous businesses to maintain the Distant Early Warning Line facilities under the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) agreement with the United States have been welcome additions. However, after almost 40 years of political development and land claim negotiations, the Canadian North and Arctic is a decidedly different place to live, work, and collaborate. Northerners, Indigenous communities, and their governments are equipped with the legal and political instruments to determine the terms of development rather than having to accept them being imposed. Going forward, northerners, Indigenous communities, and their governments need to get organized on what their terms are for participating in the global challenges facing Canada and our allies. And the federal government needs to revisit its level of ambition on the safety and security aspects of the ANPF as well as its defence policy. Canada’s Arctic and the homeland of its residents are under threat. The social, political, and legal infrastructure is in place for the region to rise to meet the threats head on, according to their terms and timelines to maximize community benefits and mitigate negative consequences for the environment and communities. However, the threats are growing, and time is running out. Following the invasion of Ukraine, it is reasonable to assume that Russian President Vladimir Putin may now choose to test Canada’s administrative conventions of requesting notice or seeking permits to traverse Canada’s ‘international waters,’ writes Stephen Van Dine. Photograph courtesy of Wikimedia Commons Russia has already extended its territorial claim over the North Pole to the edge of our 200 nautical mile economic zone. What will prevent Russia from becoming more active in those waters while the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas considers various applications from nation states that border the Arctic, including Canada? Both the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea remain disputed waters from a Canadian standpoint, where we accept the international waters designation yet request that notice or permission of traversing those waters from vessels flying a foreign flag. Canada has relative success in permitting Chinese, Russian and other countries traversing these waters for commercial or scientific regions. The speed and the magnitude of Russia’s invasion has dozens, if not hundreds, of researchers and columnists poring over past speeches by Russian President Vladimir Putin for clues on his overall ambition as well as what may have driven him to act on Ukraine in this way. There are seemingly daily columns in various media outlets indicating that the invasion was well telegraphed by looking back at Russian history, Putin’s statements, and his character. Following the invasion of Ukraine, it is reasonable to assume that Russia may now choose to test Canada’s administrative conventions of requesting notice or seeking permits to traverse Canada’s “international waters.” The NORAD system in place since the Cold War has reported a number of “incursions” or “close calls” of Russian military aircraft near Canada’s airspace. The cat-and-mouse game between Russia and the United States and its allies, including Canada, is well documented. What is also well documented is Russia’s—and in particular, Putin’s—policy and political desires for Russian dominance in the Arctic involving massive spending on civilian, military, and energy infrastructure. Closer collaboration between Russia and China is also reason for pause. China’s “belt and road” policy extends into the global Arctic that they view as an international good, despite eight nations occupying the region. Canada’s investment in co-developing the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework has the potential to accelerate the advancement of Canada’s military readiness and foreign policy in the global Arctic. Conversely, it could slow it down if northern governments and Indigenous communities and northerners are not involved in the planning, development, and proper environmental oversight of further military investment. It’s now up to both the federal government and the parties to the ANPF to use the framework to achieve their shared vision for “strong, self-reliant people and communities working together for a vibrant, prosperous and sustainable Arctic and northern region at home and abroad, while expressing Canada's enduring Arctic sovereignty.” Stephen Van Dine is the senior vice-president of the Institute on Governance. The Hill Times