THE ARAR REPORT: Summary of findings

The following is a summary of findings is taken from the analysis and recommendations book in Justice Dennis O'Connor's Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar. Information sharing prior to Mr. Arar's detention â€¢ The RCMP provided American authorities with information, including the entire database from its terrorism investigation, in ways that did not comply with RCMP policies requiring screening for relevance, reliability and personal information. Some of the information related to Mr. Arar. â€¢ The RCMP provided American authorities with information about Mr. Arar that was inaccurate, portrayed him in an unfairly negative fashion and overstated his importance in the RCMP investigation. â€¢ The RCMP provided American authorities with information about Mr. Arar without attaching written caveats, as required by RCMP policy, thereby increasing the risk that the information would be used for purposes of which the RCMP would not approve, such as sending Mr. Arar to Syria. â€¢ The RCMP requested that American authorities place lookouts for Mr. Arar and his wife, Monia Mazigh, in U.S. Customs' Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS). In the request, to which no caveats were attached, the RCMP described Mr. Arar and Dr, Mazigh as "Islamic Extremist individuals suspected of being linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist movement." The RCMP had no basis for this description, which had the potential to create serious consequences for Mr. Arar in light of American attitudes and practices at the time. â€¢ Project A-O Canada was the front-line investigative unit in the RCMP that conducted the investigation in which Mr. Arar was a person of interest, and it was that unit that provided information about Mr. Arar to American agencies. The RCMP, as an institution, gave Project A-O Canada unclear and, in some instances, misleading direction concerning the manner in which information should be shared, and failed to properly oversee the project's investigation, including its information-sharing practices. â€¢ CSIS did not share any information about Mr. Arar with the American authorities prior to his detention in New York and removal to Syria. Detention in New York and removal to Syria â€¢ There is no evidence that Canadian officials participated or acquiesced in the American authorities' decisions to detain Mr. Arar and remove him to Syria. â€¢ It is very likely that, in making the decisions to detain and remove Mr. Arar, American authorities relied on information about Mr. Arar provided by the RCMP. â€¢ While Mr. Arar was being detained in New York on Sept. 26, 2002, the RCMP provided the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with information about him, some of which portrayed him in an inaccurate and unfair way. â€¢ Without the evidence of the American authorities, I am unable to conclude what role, if any, the TECS lookout requested by the RCMP played in the American decisions to detain Mr. Arar and remove him to Syria. â€¢ During Mr. Arar's detention in New York, consular officials with the Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) took reasonable steps to provide Mr. Arar with consular services, including addressing the possibility that he might be sent to Syria. Imprisonment and mistreatment in Syria â€¢ Mr. Arar arrived in Syria on Oct. 9, 2002 and was held incommunicado until Oct. 22, 2002. In the intervening period, he was interrogated and tortured. â€¢ I am unable to conclude whether or not Canadian officials could have obtained Mr. Arar's release from Syrian imprisonment at an earlier point in time. However, there is cause for serious concern in regard to a number of actions taken by Canadian officials during Mr. Arar's imprisonment, including some that could have had an effect on the time taken to release Mr. Arar: â€¢ On receiving a summary of a statement made by Mr. Arar while in Syrian custody in early November 2002, DFAIT distributed it to the RCMP and CSIS without informing them that the statement was likely a product of torture. That statement became the basis for heightened suspicion in some minds about Mr. Arar's involvement in terrorism. That was unfair to him. â€¢ In November 2002, CSIS received information about Mr. Arar from the Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) and did not do an adequate reliability assessment as to whether the information was likely the product of torture. Indeed, its assessment was that it probably was not. â€¢ In January 2003, the RCMP, acting through the Canadian Ambassador, sent the SMI questions for Abdullah Almalki, the subject of the relevant investigation and also in Syrian custody. This action very likely sent a signal to Syrian authorities that the RCMP approved of the imprisonment and interrogation of Mr. Almalki and created a risk that the SMI would conclude that Mr. Arar, a person who had some association with Mr. Almalki, was considered a serious terrorist threat by the RCMP. â€¢ In March and April 2003, DFAIT failed to take steps to address the statement by Syrian officials that CSIS did not want Mr. Arar returned to Canada. â€¢ In May and June 2003, the RCMP and CSIS were not supportive of a DFAIT initiative to send the Syrians a letter conveying that Canada spoke with one voice in seeking Mr. Arar's release. â€¢ From time to time, DFAIT distributed reports of consular visits with Mr. Arar to the RCMP and CSIS. Ostensibly, this was done to seek assistance for Mr. Arar. However, DFAIT failed to make that purpose clear or to ensure that the reports were used only for that purpose. â€¢ On several occasions, there was a lack of communication among the Canadian agencies involved in Mr. Arar's case. There was also a lack of a single, coherent approach to efforts to obtain his release. â€¢ DFAIT consular officials took reasonable steps to obtain consular access to Mr. Arar throughout his imprisonment in Syria. After Mr. Arar's return to Canada â€¢ Following Mr. Arar's return, reports were prepared within government that had the effect of downplaying the mistreatment or torture to which Mr. Arar had been subjected. â€¢ Both before and after Mr. Arar's return to Canada, Canadian officials leaked confidential and sometimes inaccurate information about the case to the media for the purpose of damaging Mr. Arar's reputation or protecting their self-interests or government interests. â€¢ When briefing the Privy Council Office and senior government officials about the investigation regarding Mr. Arar, the RCMP omitted certain key facts that could have reflected adversely on the Force.

THE ARAR REPORT: Summary of findings

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THE ARAR REPORT: Summary of findings

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